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In February of this year, the Committee on Asian and Asian-
American Philosophers and Philosophies hosted a panel at 
the APA’s Central Division meeting in Chicago. The focus of 
the panel concerned the intersections of Asian philosophies 
and feminism. While the essays and commentary delivered for 
the panel reflected the specific academic research foci of our 
participants, there are of course many ways to understand how 
Asian philosophies and feminism intersect, or fail to intersect. 
Consequently, this section of the Newsletter aspires to expand 
on the discussions of our panel, as well as to explore additional 
territory. For it, some of our panel participants and several 
other scholars working in Asian philosophy reflect on a variety 
of related subjects. These include, for example, the search for 
affinities between feminist concerns and the concerns found 
in Asian materials; the state of the field of Asian philosophy as it 
pertains to incorporating feminist consciousness; the personal 
experiences of feminist scholars who seek to enliven their work 
with both historical sensitivity and feminist commitments; and 
the capacity of feminist readings of Asian philosophies to foster 
scholarly development and political progress. As the work 
presented here illustrates, there are many ways to frame and 
understand the import of feminism for Asian philosophies.
ARTICLES




Can Chinese philosophy and feminist philosophy come together 
and enrich one another? Due to the gender oppressive social 
practice of Chinese society in the past (e.g., foot-binding, female 
infanticide, forced contraception, etc.), the answer to this 
question may be an obvious “No.” The preoccupation with this 
issue in contemporary perceptions of Chinese culture among 
the general American public cannot be easily overstated. In my 
experience teaching Chinese philosophy and as a guest speaker 
at various occasions, this is a question that is inevitably raised 
by students and audiences. Nonetheless, my own experience 
growing up in a Taiwanese-Chinese society seems to suggest 
a more complex view. This complexity is what made me first 
become interested in the intersection of Chinese philosophy 
and feminist philosophy in my mid-teaching-career.
As a young girl growing up in Taiwan in the 1970s, my 
parents always honored the Confucian sayings: “in education, 
there should be no distinction” (Analects 15:28) and “by nature, 
humans are similar to one another; by nurture, people are far 
apart” (Analects, 17:18). It is due to these Confucian beliefs 
that they always encouraged me, my younger brother, and 
my younger sister to pursue education as far as our ability 
allowed. They sacrificed equally for all three of us regardless 
of our genders; we were always afforded equal opportunities. 
Throughout my primary, secondary, and college education, I 
had also learned of many virtuous women and heroines from 
the past three thousand years of Chinese Civilization through 
literature, poetry, and history that have inspired so many women 
and men in their shared historical reality. Nevertheless, I also 
noticed that although some of my female friends were sharing 
the good fortune of equal education opportunities, there were 
also many others who were discouraged by their families from 
pursuing a post-bachelor graduate degree for fear of societal 
sanction. After all, a too highly educated woman would not 
make a good wife.
During my search for an answer to the complex, sometimes 
puzzling, relation between Confucianism and women in 
Chinese society, I was also trying to find ways to bridge an 
East-West dialogue in my comparative philosophy course. By 
happy coincidence, I came across Karen Warren’s “Feminism 
and Ecology: Making Connections” and Chenyang Li’s “The 
Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A 
Comparative Study.”1 They became the two groundbreaking 
works for my own philosophical thinking on this subject. It is 
through Warren’s article that I began to see that the dualistic, 
“either-or” exclusive thinking that dichotomizes reason and 
emotion, form and matter, and human and Nature may not 
only be a main cause of human subjugation of nature, but may 
also contribute to the subtle tendency to subjugate the voice 
of Eastern Philosophy under the Western model. At the same 
time, Li’s article enabled me to see how Confucian philosophy 
can weigh in on important contemporary philosophical debate 
on key topics. With their differences carefully noted, I came 
to see how Confucian ethics could strengthen feminist care 
ethics’ argument in its attempt to reform modern liberal and 
contractarian ethics.
Nonetheless, in my own wrestling with the issues of 
feminist philosophy, as a Chinese-woman and a philosopher, 
I often felt not-at-home with the western liberal approach to 
these problems. The divergent historical reality of women and 
the philosophical differences in these two traditions, particularly 
their differing complementary-vs.-dualistic emphasis, is often 
ignored in the liberal gender-critique of Chinese philosophy. 
However, it has been proven time and again in history that 
any enduring social reform in a society must be empowered 
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since the phallocentric linguistic construct is too deeply 
embedded in the very core of philosophical discourse. Or, 
second, I can transcend the facticity of masculine discourse in 
philosophy. It is a human fact that men wrote most of what has 
been passed down to us and did so from men’s own viewpoint. 
There is nothing that I, as a woman and as a late comer, can 
do about it. Whether I read Kant today, tomorrow, or ten years 
hence, Kant says the same thing about the inability of women 
to be active citizens and women’s skin deep intellect. But, as 
a philosopher and as a feminist, I can choose to suspend the 
phallocentric linguistic presentation of ideas and extract useful 
ideas to further the cause of women’s liberatory movement. 
The first choice of abandonment seems awfully depressing to 
me as a philosopher who is used to my own disembodiment in 
order to blend into the wonderful world of (male) philosophical 
discourse. Yet, as a feminist, I cannot help but constantly be 
reminded of the impossible weight of my corporeality and 
gender. The only way out, as I see it, is the second choice 
of transcendence so that I can be both a philosopher and a 
feminist.
The choice of transcending the facticity of masculine 
discourse shouldn’t be limited to the Western canon but open 
to all, including Asian philosophy. One can dwell on the fact that 
most of what Confucius, Mencius, or Xunzi says has nothing to 
do with women’s liberation, or well-being per se, or one can 
choose to suspend that limitation and extract the relevance of the 
ideas of ren, reciprocity, and relationality to a more wholesome 
vision of human society where gender oppression is a historical 
past, not an ongoing struggle. Much of the prejudice against the 
incorporation of, or just a sheer neglect of, the relevance of Asian 
philosophy to feminism in the West has been centered on the 
explicit sexist references found in the tradition. But this facticity 
of masculine discourse is common to all traditions, be they 
East, West, North, or South, so my question would be this: Why 
selectively exclude non-Western canons in feminist discourse? 
As an Asian American, I cannot help but constantly be afflicted 
by the cultural inferiority complex in the discourse of gender. Is 
it possible to be a Confucian and a feminist at the same time? 
Or, as far as gender is considered, must one be either/or? Again, 
the choice of transcendence instead of exclusion seems more 
appealing to me. As Confucius’ disciple, Zixia, says to Sima Niu 
who laments the fact that only he has no brother, within the 
four seas, all are one’s brothers (Analects 12.5). In the same 
spirit, I am making (masculine) philosophy feminist in accord 
with a feminist’s image of herself. So, in the end, I have lived 
up to Nietzsche’s dictum of becoming who I am: a woman, a 
philosopher, a feminist, and a Confucian.
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Our first musings on the connections between Asian philosophy 
and feminism began about ten years go when we were both 
Master’s students in philosophy at the University of Hawaii–
Manoa. As nascent feminist philosophers, we were particularly 
attracted to the well-established comparative, East-West 
philosophical methodology that the Hawaii department is 
known for. It seemed obvious to us at the time that the guiding 
principles of the comparative methodology that we were 
being trained in are methodological principles that are also 
necessary to any rigorous feminist philosophy. For example, 
one of the primary aims of comparative methodology is to 
expose the latent and truth-obscuring assumptions inherent 
in our traditions of origin. Raimundo Panikkar succinctly 
expresses this self-reflective and self-critical orientation when 
he writes that comparative philosophy “saves us from the 
fallacy that all others live in myths except us” (1988, 135). In 
this way, comparative philosophy helps us to realize that “we 
are not the only source of (self-) understanding” (Panikkar 
1988, 128). In a similar vein, Daya Krishna suggests that this 
aspect of comparative philosophy facilitates a kind of liberation: 
“comparative philosophy has the chance to function as a mutual 
liberator of each philosophical tradition from the limitations 
imposed up on it by its own past” (1988, 83). Comparative 
philosophy teaches us that philosophical problems could be 
(and have been) framed and solved differently. In doing so, it 
“frees [our] conceptual imagination” and asks us to step out 
of our own narrow philosophical perspectives, both of which 
spark a level of philosophical creativity that is rarely attained 
within tradition-specific approaches. In short, diversity (of 
traditions, worldviews, ideas, and so on) is a hallmark of a 
comparative methodology, just as it is (or should be) for feminist 
philosophy.
In addition to the self-reflective and pluralistic orientations 
of comparative methodology, Eliot Deutsch writes of the 
creative and transformative nature of comparative practice that 
comes from engagement with a wide array of perspectives. 
According to Deutsch, we should not study the insights of 
other cultures merely for the sake of acquiring more resources 
or bolstering our own positions; we should instead practice 
comparative philosophy because it changes our intellectual 
constitution for the better. Deutsch argues against a grand 
synthesis of world thought that marked the earliest attempts 
at comparative philosophy. Instead, he advocates a coming 
together of fruits of the widest possible human experience. 
Insofar as philosophical theories attempt to describe human 
experience, the consideration of a more diverse array of human 
experience in the course of theory-construction will more likely 
produce a theory that is representative of human experience 
as a whole—and this is especially the case for any theory that 
aspires to universal applicability. The comparativist learns by 
“being ready to undergo the different philosophical experiences 
of other people,” and he or she enhances the validity of his or her 
philosophical insights by “systematically taking into account the 
universal range of human experience inasmuch as it is possible 
to do so in any concrete situation” (Panikkar 1988, 128-129).
As we can see from this brief discussion of comparative 
methodology, comparative philosophy develops as a result 
of philosophical diversity, depends upon a broad range of 
human experience from which to theorize, and finds creative 
impetus in continuously scrutinizing (one’s own) philosophical 
assumptions. However, despite its willingness to engage with 
philosophical difference and ideas on the margins of the 
discipline, we did find that comparative philosophy seemed 
to repeat wider disciplinary attitudes in regard to its lack of 
sustained attention to women’s lives, experiences, and voices. 
And, in doing so, comparative methodology rejects in practice 
the ideals that it holds in theory. This lack of feminist analysis 
was quite apparent to us during our early philosophical training, 
particularly when we studied feminist philosophy one semester 
and comparative methodologies the next. As students who had 
a foot in each terrain, so to speak, we could see the similarities 
between the two philosophical approaches clearly, as well as 
the ways in which the content of one field overlapped with 
the other and vice versa. And yet, comparative philosophy 
and feminist philosophy were taught to us as two distinct 
philosophical areas. For example, at the time gender was 
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never explored as a valid site of comparison in our comparative 
courses; what was most philosophically interesting was “cross-
cultural comparison.” The implicit assumption here was 
that men and women who inhabited the same geographical 
regions shared the same “culture” and, therefore, the same 
philosophical assumptions and worldviews. On this account, if 
you are reading a man’s account of his culture, then practicing 
rigorous comparative methodology would not demand that 
you also read a woman’s account of that culture in order to 
ensure the widest possible account of human experience. Our 
material reality as women students of comparative philosophy 
reinforced this unexamined idea, since we rarely (if ever) read 
women philosophers in our comparative and Asian courses, 
seldom had the companionship of other women in our classes, 
and the “great comparativists” who taught us and whose work 
we studied were all men. There is a sense in which this way of 
practicing and teaching comparative philosophy suggests that 
either a male philosophical voice automatically includes (or, is 
identical to) a woman’s or that hers is inessential.
Given the supposed openness and sensitivity to diversity 
inherent in comparative methodology, the lack of feminist 
analysis and consideration of the interplay between gender 
and culture was frustrating—though perhaps not surprising (as 
we now know) given the predominance of male philosophers 
across all traditions and within the discipline itself. We find 
gender analysis to be an invaluable addition to philosophical 
thinking and an essential way of expressing the guiding 
values of comparative methodology. In its most basic form, 
feminist theorizing begins from the experience of women and 
considers alternative constructions of traditional ways of seeing, 
experiencing, cognizing, feeling, and embodying our everyday 
realities and truths. Just as Asian philosophy has helped 
expand Westerners’ worldviews by presenting reasonable 
alternatives to metaphysical, epistemological, aesthetic, 
and ethical assumptions, so too does feminist philosophy 
challenge the very foundations of taken-for-granted theories. 
Therefore, given the absence of considerations of gender in 
comparative philosophy—an absence that was starkly visible 
from our location as women students of Asian philosophy 
and as feminists—we began to construct a robustly pluralistic 
methodology that could engage with a wider breadth of 
human experience than did earlier articulations of comparative 
methodology. It is at this pivotal time that our vision of feminist 
comparative philosophy began to take shape.
We see feminist comparative philosophy as a natural 
outgrowth of both comparative philosophy and feminist 
philosophy. East-West comparative philosophy and feminist 
philosophy already share much in terms of methodology: a 
hermeneutic of openness and respect for difference, a crossing 
of philosophical boundaries and traditions, a rejection of the 
dichotomy of theory and practice, and the pursuit of new ways 
of looking at the world. In our work, we seek to show how 
bringing diverse philosophical traditions into dialogue with 
each other can provide fresh insights on questions of specific 
interest to feminists and global theorists generally. We believe 
that what distinguishes feminist comparative philosophy from 
transnational/global/postcolonial feminist theories is that 
feminist comparative methodology engages an analysis of 
original and primary philosophical sources from the tradition in 
question. Most importantly, we wish to emphasize that feminist 
comparative methodology fosters the development of original, 
creative concepts and ideas that may not have emerged had 
the philosopher been thinking within the confines of one 
tradition only.
To demonstrate the breadth and sophistication of 
emerging work in feminist comparative philosophy and to give 
greater definition to the aims, content, and scope of this new 
philosophical field, we are currently editing a volume of essays 
at this exciting crossroads: Liberating Traditions: Essays in 
Feminist Comparative Philosophy. The essays in this collection 
span a variety of philosophical locations that are each tied to 
specific geographical, linguistic, temporal, historical, religious, 
social, economic, and political positions, and yet they each 
integrate these various perspectives in innovative ways while 
being mindful of the unique particularity of each perspective in 
question. We hope that Asian and comparative philosophers and 
feminist philosophers alike will find fresh insights on topics that 
are at the center of their fields of study, such as embodiment, 
sexual difference, the constraints of agency, non-dualistic 
metaphysics, the transformation of consciousness, cultivation 
of ethical relationships, examinations of alterity and difference, 
and cross-cultural hermeneutics. In addition to the breadth and 
depth of these philosophical conversations, with this volume 
we also hope to show how our own philosophical traditions of 
origin can be liberated from their narrow confines and brought 
into dialogue for both the advancement of our philosophical 
projects and our shared lives together. We believe that feminist 
comparative philosophy demonstrates the practice of pluralistic 
philosophy par excellence and will be instrumental not only 
in correcting some shortcomings of current philosophical 
methodology, but also in moving the discipline of philosophy 
another step forward in our generation.
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Feminism has much to gain from a close reading of Asian 
philosophies. Stereotypical views of Asian cultures as 
irretrievably misogynist obscure both the constructive and 
deconstructive contributions Asian philosophies can make to 
feminist discourse. I will briefly outline doctrines found in key 
schools that can support and further feminist aims: 1) Daoism’s 
radical reassessment of the “feminine” (Yin), 2) Confucianism’s 
advocacy of the universal potential for self-cultivation, and 3) 
Mahayana Buddhism’s deconstruction of sexism as one among 
many forms of discrimination. Since I have already discussed 
points two and three elsewhere, my main focus here will be 
Daoism.
Throughout the discussion I maintain a distinction 
between women and social constructs of the “feminine.” The 
same distinction applies to men and “masculine” constructs. 
Hence, I am assuming that women are not hard-wired to 
be stereotypically feminine, nor men to be stereotypically 
masculine. Values, assumptions, and behavior patterns 
designated as feminine or masculine can and do apply to 
both men or women.1 We come from the same planet and are 
members of the same species.
